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Russia’s New Political Economy and the 2018 World Cup
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1Department of Geography and Sustainability, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
2Center for Global Urbanism, Ural Federal University, Ekaterinburg, Russia
The economic crisis since 2010 has affected Russia’s political economy by reducing the
income available to fund political loyalty—the key mechanism of neopatrimonialism.
Through an investigation of key infrastructure development projects, we examine how this
crisis has affected the preparations for the 2018 Football World Cup. In so doing we
introduce the concept of crisis neopatrimonialism, referring to the political and economic
adaptations of a neopatrimonial system in response to economic crisis. Our research uncov-
ered three major adaptations of neopatrimonialism in the context of World Cup preparations:
a retreat of private money and concomitant rise in public funding, a reordering of favored
elites, and higher costs of loyalty.
INTRODUCTION
The multi-year process of preparing a city to host a mega-
event such as the Olympics or the Football World Cup is
often costly and contentious (Giulianotti et al. 2015;
Lenskyj 2008). Hosting requirements typically include
major infrastructure projects that have lasting effects on
cities, with the result that mega-event preparations com-
monly involve a variety of urban development agendas
(Chalkley and Essex 1999; Gaffney 2010; Hiller 2000;
Poynter et al. 2015). In Russia, where neopatrimonial rela-
tionships suffuse political and business life, preparing for
the 2014 Sochi Olympics enriched a network of well-con-
nected elites (Müller 2011; Orttung and Zhemukhov 2014).
In anticipation of the 2018 Football World Cup, however,
the economic crisis has introduced complications to this
system, diminishing the flow of rents and hampering the
state’s ability to fulfill contractual obligations for delivering
necessary infrastructure. At the same time, this crisis-dri-
ven reduction in rents has altered the neopatrimonial order.
Scholars commonly use the term neopatrimonialism to
describe Russia’s political economy (Gel’man 2015; Sakwa
2009; van Zon 2008). Neopatrimonialism refers to a system
of governance where patrons and clients exchange rents for
loyalty, as in an archetypal patrimonial society, but existing
within the legal framework of a rational bureaucratic struc-
ture (Erdmann and Engel 2007; Weber 1997). The usage of
this term in Russia is an attempt to describe the omnipre-
sent but hidden networks of dynamic personal relationships
within the nation’s political and business landscapes.
Since it is based on a system of exchanging rents for
loyalty, neopatrimonialism requires a stable or increasing
flow of rents in order to function. This was the case in
Russia between 2000 and the global financial crisis of
2008. Although Russia recovered macroeconomic growth
relatively rapidly after the crisis, by 2014 the economy had
again entered recession (World Bank 2016). This was a
consequence of the falling oil price, economic sanctions
in the wake of the Crimean annexation, a decline in the
value of the ruble and a subsequent drop in consumer
confidence, and a number of unresolved structural reforms.
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has called this situation
the “new reality” that Russia has to deal with (Medvedev
2015, 8). So how does a neopatrimonial system function in
the new reality of economic stagnation or shrinkage, when
the potential pool of rents is diminished?
Address correspondence to Sven Daniel Wolfe, Geopolis 3514,
CH-1015, Lausanne, Switzerland. E-mail: SvenDaniel.Wolfe@unil.ch.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 65, no. 2, 2018, 101–114
Copyright © Sven Daniel Wolfe and Martin Müller. Published with license by Taylor and Francis.
ISSN: 1075-8216 (print)/1557-783X (online)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2018.1429934
In this paper, we suggest there is a particular, crisis-
provoked neopatrimonialism that has emerged during the
preparations for the 2018 World Cup. We call this crisis
neopatrimonialism, that is, a neopatrimonial system
working in a situation of diminished or interrupted
rents. The World Cup, hosted in eleven cities and shaped
by the obligation to fulfill infrastructural hosting require-
ments, has been one of Russia’s largest projects in the
years since 2010, when hosting rights were awarded. We
investigate the World Cup–driven national development
program and, from the total pool of infrastructure pro-
jects, we highlight three cases: the reconstruction of a
training stadium in Rostov; the construction of new
training facilities in Sochi; and the expansion and mod-
ernization of the airport in Kaliningrad. We use these
cases to identify three features that we consider indica-
tive of crisis neopatrimonialism: a decrease in private
investment and a concomitant rise in public funding; a
reordering of favored elites; and higher prices for elite
loyalty. We base our analysis on a variety of documents,
including contracts signed between FIFA (the interna-
tional football federation) and the Russian government;
federal documents that define infrastructure projects;
documentation for the project tenders; reports from
local and national Russian media; documents from busi-
nesses involved with the preparations; and economic
reports from national and international organizations.
We endeavor to explore how the economic crisis has
affected Russian neopatrimonialism as exemplified in
the preparations for the 2018 World Cup, and we reflect
on whether this emergence of crisis neopatrimonialism
applies to the broader Russian political economy.
NEOPATRIMONIALISM AND RUSSIA
Neopatrimonialism typically refers to a hybrid system of
governance where the exchange of rents for loyalty blends
with a legal, bureaucratic structure. The term originates
from Max Weber’s notion of legitimate patrimonial rule,
as opposed to his ideal-type rational-legal authority (Weber
1997). The prefix neo- has been interpreted differently by
various scholars, but generally is used to indicate an exten-
sion of traditional patrimonial authority into the modern
age, as a suffusion of patrimonial patterns into rational-
legal structures (Bratton and Walle 1997). The academic
literature boasts a wealth of research on sub-Saharan Africa
covering dual regimes where a patrimonial logic such as
clientelism exists alongside a legal bureaucratic structure
(Bratton and Walle 1997). The concept has traveled to
Latin American, Middle Eastern, South-East Asian, and
post-communist states (e.g., Bach 2011; Brownlee 2002;
Gabriel 1999; Un and So 2011). Often, the term has been
employed as shorthand for corrupt, dysfunctional regimes,
but Anne Pitcher et al. (2009) note that this usage threatens
to dilute the concept beyond analytical utility, perpetuating
normative judgments based on ideal-type government
structures that do not exist.
In the post-Soviet arena, scholars have employed
neopatrimonialism as a partial explanation for how the
region’s states have survived despite institutional weak-
ness (Franke et al. 2009; Guliyev 2011; Ikhamov 2013).
Work here has demarcated regimes along a neopatrimo-
nial spectrum, ranging from sultanistic (in Central Asia)
to oligarchic (in Ukraine, Georgia, and Yeltsin-era
Russia) and bureaucratic (in Belarus and, perhaps, con-
temporary Russia) (Guliyev 2007). Other scholars have
tried specifically to grasp the opaque networks of
patronage and personal connection that pervade busi-
ness and political life in Russia (Fisun 2012; Robinson
2011, 2013; van Zon 2008). Some emphasize the poli-
tical personalism of the Russian neopatrimonial system,
highlighting the central role of the president (Baturo
and Elkink 2016; Hale 2014). Others downplay the
individual and focus instead on the hierarchical struc-
ture of “the system” or the “power vertical” in which
actors, cliques, and coalitions compete for rents
(Gel’man 2015; Ledeneva 2013). In most accounts,
Russian neopatrimonialism has been described as
dynamic, shifting, and marked by the difficulty of
obtaining reliable data on these opaque and unstable
relationships.
In this paper we take neopatrimonialism to mean a
system of governance with a pervasive network of
patron–client relationships permeating and permeated by
a legal-rational bureaucratic structure, wherein actors
exchange loyalty for rents (Erdmann and Engel 2007;
Pitcher et al. 2009). We move beyond using neopatrimo-
nialism as a catch-all to explain corruption and cronyism,
instead employing the term to describe Russia’s inter-
mingled network of patronage relations and legal struc-
tures while acknowledging the reciprocal legitimacy of
this system to its participants. It is also important to
emphasize that the country’s neopatrimonial relationships
were already dynamic and shifting before 2010, the date
when Russia was granted World Cup hosting rights and
which marks the beginning of our data-collection period.
Despite the fluidity of the relationships that make up
neopatrimonial systems, these systems depend on a stable
flow of rents from which to fund patronage (Escribà-
Folch and Wright 2010). From this point, we develop
the concept of crisis neopatrimonialism to explore what
happens when the rent flow is interrupted or diminished,
as has been the case in Russia during World Cup pre-
parations and the economic crisis.
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METHODS
This paper is based on documentary analysis and informed
by the confines of researching mega-events. We follow in the
line of scholars who have used mega-events as an entry point
to examine the political economy of host nations and cities
(Hiller 2006; Orttung and Zhemukhov 2014). The high
media interest that accompanies mega-events also helps
shed light on areas and relations that may otherwise be
difficult to investigate, particularly in opaque research envir-
onments. Crucially, hosting mega-events means satisfying
contractual requirements that commonly involve major inter-
ventions into urban space. Since we are interested in the
2018 World Cup, this means beginning with FIFA infrastruc-
ture requirements and following them as they are interpreted
by the Russian hosting authorities. This led to Russian
Federal Decree 518, the government document that under-
girds the 272 World Cup infrastructure projects distributed
among the nation’s host cities (Russian Federal Government
2013). This document establishes general program budgets
and, for each project, the financing source: federal, regional,
private, or mixtures of these three. Originally released in
2013, this governing document underwent 23 revisions by
2016. We studied these revisions in order to identify changes
and trends in the infrastructure development program, map-
ping shifts in financing sources over time. When we identi-
fied an interesting project, we sourced related documents for
more comprehensive investigation. These included govern-
ment documents (such as construction contracts and public
statements from regional and municipal officials); business
websites and press releases from companies involved in the
projects; and reports from Russian local, regional, and
national media. Using these sources, we attempted to deter-
mine the ownership structure of the properties in question,
and the various government and business actors involved in
the project. In this way we monitored World Cup infrastruc-
ture developments to identify how Russia’s neopatrimonial
system reacted to the decrease in rents caused by the eco-
nomic crisis.
From our investigation of the 272 World Cup infrastruc-
ture projects, we highlight three representative cases: the
reconstruction of a training stadium in Rostov; the cancela-
tion of a stadium refurbishment project and subsequent
construction of a new training stadium in Sochi; and the
reconstruction of an airport in Kaliningrad. We chose these
cases because they are the best available illustrations of the
new dynamics in Russia’s neopatrimonial system.
That said, we need to acknowledge the constraints under
which any study of neopatrimonialism in Russia, and closed
contexts more generally (Koch 2013), operates. Ideally, one
would like to catch exchanges of rent for loyalty in the act and
have statements on record from elites as to whom they gave
preferential treatment to and for what reasons. The opaque
nature of neopatrimonialism, and of political and economic
processes in Russia in general, makes that impossible. This
constraint, however, should not lead us to abandon research
on neopatrimonialism in Russia altogether, as Paul Goode
(2010) convincingly insists. Instead, we need to adjust our
expectations in terms of the wealth and conclusiveness of data
available. We therefore base our case on circumstantial evi-
dence, from which we infer the dynamics of particular neopa-
trimonial mechanisms in operation. There may be other
interpretations for each of the three cases we analyze and we
mention some of those where appropriate. Taken together,
however, neopatrimonialism is a plausible model to explain
the dynamics we observe, but it may not be the only one.
There are also several complications involved in working
on a relatively short-term project like the World Cup. First, it
is important to note that, at the time of writing, the 2018World
Cup has not yet been completed. Further along these lines,
since our study concerns only the years 2010 to 2016, it is fair
to ask whether this timeframe is an adequate period for
investigation. We strive to allay these concerns by underscor-
ing that, in the first instance, every infrastructure project
needed to fulfill contractual obligations for hosting the
World Cup was already underway by the end of our research
period. While some details of the projects may change by the
time of the games (for example the financial totals or actors
involved), we believe that the overall trends are already visi-
ble and that we have witnessed crisis-driven changes in
Russia’s neopatrimonial World Cup preparations. Second,
since beginning our study in 2010 does not give us a non-
crisis baseline against which to measure changes in Russian
neopatrimonialism, we endeavor to reflect non-crisis neopa-
trimonialism by referencing the relevant literature.
ECONOMIC CRISIS
Starting in 2010, Russia’s economic stagnation and crisis
was brought about by a confluence of its overreliance on oil
rents, the worldwide collapse in oil prices, and Western
sanctions over the conflict in Ukraine. A stagnation or fall
in a variety of key economic indicators demonstrates the
extent of this crisis. Annual growth rates for GDP and GNI
per capita dropped between 2010 and 2015, as Figure 1
shows. From 2014 (the year of the Crimean annexation and
subsequent sanctions), Russia entered a period of recession:
it saw the lowest budget revenues since 1999, a rise in
poverty levels, drops in foreign direct investment, and a
fall in nationwide real wages in 2015 by almost 10 percent
—the worst performance since the 1990s (Russian Federal
State Statistics Service 2016; World Bank 2016). The
Russian Ministry of Economic Development predicted
that the economy would exit outright recession by 2017,
but nonetheless expected a full 20 years of low growth,
forecasting between 1.7 percent and 2.6 percent until 2035
(Kuvshinova and Prokopenko 2016).
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Diminished economic growth leads to smaller government
budgets, as shown in Figure 2. The federal budget has been
shrinking in real terms since 2013, with a marked dent in 2016
and 2017. Moreover, the increasing discrepancy between
income and expenditures since 2015 has put increasing pressure
on the budget. This discrepancy not only impacts the state’s
ability to fulfill budgetary commitments, but also has a potential
effect on the functioning of the neopatrimonial system. Since
neopatrimonialism relies on a stable or growing flow of rents
from which to fund patronage, what happens to the stability of
the system when this flow is interrupted? Together, the shrink-
ing economy and increasing budget deficits caused a situation
of economic insecurity that has affected preparations for the
World Cup, leading to project delays, higher material costs, and
broken budgets. But do these problems indicate that economic
crisis has forced changes to the functioning of Russian neopa-
trimonialism? This is the question to which we now turn.
CRISIS NEOPATRIMONIALISM AND THE WORLD
CUP
Crisis neopatrimonialism refers to the political and eco-
nomic adaptations of a neopatrimonial system in response
to a situation of economic crisis (see Table 1 for a summary
of differences between neopatrimonialism variants). The
concept begins from the understanding that the foundation
of a neopatrimonial system is the exchange of rents for
loyalty. If economic crisis diminishes or interrupts the flow
of rents, it upsets the system’s regular functioning and
forces a sequence of political and economic choices in
order to maintain stability. Crisis neopatrimonialism is the
term we use to describe these choices and to explore the
altered state of the neopatrimonial system in Russia due to
the economic crisis, during the preparations for the 2018
World Cup.
FIGURE 1 Russian GDP and GNI/PPP, 2010 – 2015, with predictions through 2017 (indicated by the letter "e"). Adjusted for inflation. Sources: World
Bank, Russian Ministry of Economic Development, Vedomosti, Russian Federal State Statistics Service, International Monetary Fund.
FIGURE 2 Russian federal budget income and expenditures, 2010 – 2017, with predictions through 2019 (indicated by the letter "e"). Adjusted for
inflation. Sources: Russian Federal Ministry of Finance, Russian Federal State Statistics Service, World Bank, OECD.
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It is not uncommon for scholars to use mega-events as a
microcosm to study the political economy of countries and
cities (Gaffney 2010; Raco 2012, 2014). Mega-events also
tend to provide good cases for exploring neopatrimonial-
ism, as they involve the disbursement of sizable funds
within limited timeframes, often with minimal scrutiny
and limited accountability—conditions that facilitate neo-
patrimonial relationships. In Brazil, infrastructure prepara-
tions for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics were
used to distribute rents to well-connected elites (Gaffney
2010); and in Russia, the 2014 Sochi Olympics enriched
various factions of security services and oligarchs, trading
economic rewards for loyalty in order to maintain the
integrity of the ruling coalition (Orttung and Zhemukhov
2014). Government contracts to build stadiums, airports,
roads, and hotels for mega-events are a favorite vehicle for
channeling funds toward cronies, with the time pressure of
looming mega-event deadlines often being claimed as the
reason for awarding contracts instead of conducting public
tenders.
The 2018 World Cup, too, has experienced a large share
of neopatrimonial quid pro quo between government and
elites, despite attempts to break with the profligate spend-
ing for Sochi 2014 and to demonstrate a novel approach to
the planning of state expenditure (Kazmin’ et al. 2013).
While there is little research on the 2018 World Cup to
date, that which exists has documented rigged tenders for
stadiums, prices inflated by contractors, the awarding of
construction projects as political favors, and smokescreen
public participation (Makarychev and Yatsyk 2015; Müller
2017). Though most of the spending for the 2014 Sochi
Olympics happened during declining growth but relative
budgetary stability in the years 2010 to 2013, the major
spending for the World Cup, budgeted for the years 2015 to
2017, occurred in times of economic recession and shrink-
ing budget revenues (see Figures 1 and 2).
The 2018 World Cup will take place in twelve stadiums
in eleven host cities across European Russia, likely drawing
the attention of over a billion people worldwide (FIFA
2014). World Cup cities must meet an exhaustive list of
FIFA infrastructure requirements before the games begin.
Host authorities—the coalition of government and business
elites granted power by presidential decree to prepare for
the World Cup—spearhead infrastructure projects to fulfill
the nation’s contractual obligations with FIFA. This process
takes years and is hugely expensive, with costs typically in
the billions of U.S. dollars. FIFA requirements are wide-
ranging, covering developments for each host city’s tourna-
ment and training stadiums, airport and public transport
system, event security, fan zones, and hotels (FIFA 2010a,
2011). FIFA’s plans are not implemented in a vacuum,
however, but imported into host cities with already existing
development agendas. In Russia, where subnational gov-
ernments rely heavily on budgetary support from Moscow,
preparing for the World Cup involves negotiations between
host authorities who must fulfill FIFA requirements, muni-
cipal actors with separate or overlapping ideas for devel-
opment funds, and federal actors with their own plans for
regional development.
Starting from a thorough examination of the revisions in
Decree 518 (the federal document that governs the World
Cup infrastructure development program), we identify three
general changes in Russia’s neopatrimonial system, sum-
marized in Table 2: state assumption of projects to relieve
private financial obligations; a reordering of elites; and an
increase in the price of loyalty among elites. We document
these features expressed in World Cup infrastructure pro-
jects as financial rewards for certain actors, a narrowing of
the circle of favorites, and cost overruns and work stop-
pages. We demonstrate these features in three case studies,
observing how the economic crisis affected Russia’s neo-
patrimonial networks in the context of fulfilling FIFA’s
infrastructure requirements.
Public Funding for Private Gain
Funding to prepare for the World Cup was presented as
an even split between federal support on one side, and
regional and private sources on the other (Rozhkov
2013). When the initial funding arrangement was drawn
up in 2010, the economy was in recovery from the 2008
crisis, but expectations of another boom (as in
2000–2008) were tempered by cautious postures from
government and public discussions of the need for eco-
nomic restraint (Kremlin.ru 2009; Vzgliad 2009). Since
TABLE 1
Selected Features of Standard and Crisis Neopatrimonialism Variants
Features Neopatrimonialism Crisis Neopatrimonialism
Flow of rents Stable or growing Diminished or interrupted
Neopatrimonial relationships Stable or growing Unstable or diminishing
Elite decision- making environment Minimal constraints Constrained
Competition for rents Normal Increased
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2014, the economic crisis has shifted these initial funding
arrangements by inducing changes in usual neopatrimo-
nial functioning. One of these changes is a significant
decrease in private funding for projects, due primarily to
economic uncertainty, higher inflation, and a prolonged
negative outlook from the continuing sanctions.
Since World Cup developments are protected by inter-
national legal agreements and must be completed, we see a
disappearance of private investors concurrent with federal
and regional governments stepping in to fund the necessary
work. In the many revisions of Decree 518, when the state
did not cut privately funded projects outright, it reoriented
funding schemes to relieve private actors of the obligation
to pay. This speaks to a particular characteristic of neopa-
trimonial economic functioning: in a non-neopatrimonial
system, actors might invest in a project because they expect
a financial return. In Russia’s neopatrimonial World Cup
preparations, however, we see actors investing in projects
not necessarily because of financial reasons, but rather
political ones. What might be the initial reasoning behind
these investments? Since a financial return in many of these
endeavors is unlikely, we infer that some actors are invest-
ing in relationships with the power structure. What does it
mean, then, when an actor is removed from funding obliga-
tions, as revealed in the revisions to Decree 518? Does this
deletion necessarily indicate a removal from favor? We
argue that, in cases where the investor is removed from
funding obligations but remains the owner of the property
in question, then that removal represents a significant gift.
In this way, the state assumes funding obligations to
improve the property of a private entity. It is possible, of
course, that other explanations could lie behind such finan-
cially quizzical moves. Under rigid World Cup time con-
straints, the state might have assumed responsibility to
guarantee that work would be completed on time, for
example. We cannot know what transpired to make deci-
sion makers adjust Decree 518 in these ways, but we
maintain that neopatrimonial relationships are a plausible
explanation for understanding these developments, and that
seemingly illogical decisions begin to make sense when
viewed through the lens of crisis neopatrimonialism.
We can see this dynamic at work in Rostov, a port city
of 1 million people about 1000 km south of Moscow. Aside
from the main stadium that will host the official matches,
World Cup host cities must provide teams with housing and
adequate facilities for training, and each training field must
meet stringent FIFA standards for quality and privacy
(FIFA 2011). Decree 518 establishes three training sta-
diums in Rostov, all of which need reconstruction, but we
focus here on the site that needs attention most: Lokomotiv
stadium, located in the city’s railway district. This dilapi-
dated Soviet-era facility is more dirt than grass, and a few
bare concrete benches stand beyond the cracked running
track surrounding the field. The territory also includes a
bicycle track and a building with changing rooms, gymna-
siums for indoor sports, and office space. Currently a sports
club uses the indoor facilities, offering classes and indoor
football. Ownership of the stadium and club is unclear—
conversations with the sports club administration revealed
contradictory ownership information, while phone calls and
emails to the stadium administration went unanswered—
but it appears ownership is split at least between the Rostov
regional government, the state company Russian Railways,
and an unknown actor (Kliuchko 2014; RZD 2015).
The original version of Decree 518 established that
private actors would pay for the reconstruction of the
training stadium (Russian Federal Government 2013).
This plan had changed by 2016, when Rostov’s Ministry
of Construction, Architecture, and Regional Development
held a public tender for the stadium reconstruction plan.
The contract was awarded for 331.9 million rubles ($5.1
million) to Armstroi, a construction company from the city
of Ryazan, and the revisions of Decree 518 reveal that the
original private actors had vanished, leaving federal and
regional budgets to foot the bill (RosTender 2016a; Russian
Federal Government 2016). Remembering that these infra-
structure projects must be completed no matter the cost, the
disappearance of the private sector saddles the public with
ever-higher financial burdens.
The Rostov regional government began the Lokomotiv
training stadium project by spending 13 million rubles
($200,000) to develop a reconstruction plan that fulfills
TABLE 2
Processes of Crisis Neopatrimonialism as Reflected in the 2018 Football World Cup
Feature of crisis
neopatrimonialism Process Key example
Public funding for private
gain
Financial reward for certain actors as state assumes
obligation to pay
Private sector disappears; state funds training stadium reconstruction
in Rostov
Reordering of elites Change of beneficiaries from rent flows Cancelation of stadium refurbishment in Sochi, constructing new
training stadium instead
Increased costs of loyalty
among elites
Cost overruns and work stoppages resulting in higher
rents
Delays in reconstruction of airport in Kaliningrad; replacement of
key actors
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FIFA requirements (Goriaev 2015). This plan called for the
same international quality pitch as in the World Cup sta-
diums, seats for 500 spectators, appropriate stadium light-
ing, and a privacy fence five meters high to screen training
sessions from view. Further, the running and bicycle tracks
were slated for renovation, and the nearby sports building
was to be demolished and replaced by a multistory facility
with changing rooms and meeting space (Besedin 2015;
Krylova 2016). Originally, the Kavras company, a three-
way partnership between local businessmen Andrei
Lukianov, Sergei Levchenko, and the Maevskii family,
agreed to invest 210 million rubles ($3.2 million) to repair
the stadium’s bicycle track and construct the adjacent sport
facilities building (Goriaev 2015). By the following year,
however, Kavras withdrew entirely from the project, giving
no explanation for their departure (Stepanov 2016).
Nevertheless, the gymnasiums, changing rooms, and meet-
ing space that Kavras promised to fund must still be built—
despite the company’s withdrawal. In the context of ful-
filling FIFA obligations, then, the state must ensure this
project’s funding and completion. With no other investors
forthcoming, the regional budget is funding the necessary
construction.
It is not clear why the private sector abandoned its obli-
gations to fund these projects—perhaps the economic crisis
affected their appetite for risk or they may have been pushed
out against their will. What is unmistakable, however, is that
these events are part of a broader trend of hosting authorities
assuming private obligations in the context of economic
pressure, while in many cases leaving ownership structures
intact. Examining Decree 518 between 2013 and 2016
reveals over 150 project amendments and cuts made in
order to adjust to the crisis. This resulted in savings of
44.4 billion rubles ($683 million), of which fully 67.7 per-
cent benefited the private sector (see Figure 3).
The overall reduction of the potential pool of rents due
to the economic crisis led us initially to assume that we
should see a concomitant reduction in rents distributed
down the neopatrimonial network. Instead, we saw that
the state assumed a larger financial burden while relieving
private actors of their obligations. The processes we see in
Rostov—and mirrored in World Cup developments nation-
wide—represent an entrenchment and expansion of the role
of the state in the economy and, concurrently, indicate a
bonanza giveaway to the private sector.
Reordering of Elites
Neopatrimonial systems rely on a stable or growing pool of
rents from which to fund patronage. As the economic crisis
diminishes the overall pool of rents in Russia, we see actors
in the neopatrimonial system fighting for a share of the
shrinking pie. We identify the winners and losers in this
competition by comparing the revisions of Decree 518. For
instance, when a project from an earlier revision is canceled
and replaced, we can compare the project details in order to
identify differences that may give clues to shed light on
why these decisions were made. There are problems, how-
ever, with a lack of data due to the impossibility of seeing
into the black box of the relationships that undergird these
business decisions. In order to address this issue, we work
backwards from the available evidence and put forward a
possible interpretation based on an exploration of the pro-
jects and the constellations of actors involved. In so doing,
we can infer which actors managed to secure a place at the
neopatrimonial table and which actors were excluded. In
this case, our analysis uncovers the related processes of
increased competition among elites and the narrowing of
the circle of favored clients.
In 2013, Decree 518 designated four training stadiums in
Sochi for reconstruction. Three of these were privately
owned facilities while the fourth was owned by Russian
Railways and served as practice grounds for the Moscow-
based Lokomotiv football club (not to be confused with the
training stadium of the same name in Rostov). The three
private stadiums were part of larger sport complexes that
include fitness and resort facilities such as hotels, gymna-
siums, running tracks, and spas. These private properties
were ideally suited to serve as base camp training sites and
hotels for visiting World Cup teams. FIFA requirements
FIGURE 3 Who benefits from World Cup budget cuts? Sources: Multiple revisions of Federal Decree 518.
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would necessitate upgrades to some of the facilities—for
instance improving the quality of the football pitches,
ensuring the privacy of training sessions, and enhancing
the comfort of the hotel accommodations—but given that
most of these properties had already been updated for the
2014 Sochi Olympics, these projects would likely be rela-
tively minor and affordable. Only the Lokomotiv stadium
required more significant work, as it had been overlooked
during the Olympic preparations. From the start, each of
these projects was privately funded.
In response to budget pressure from the economic crisis,
the government revised Decree 518 in early 2015 to reduce
the number of training stadiums nationwide. In Sochi, this
revision cut all four original training sites and replaced
them with three new projects. The Lokomotiv stadium, no
longer slated for World Cup–related upgrades, fell from
favor almost immediately. The director of Russian
Railways declared the company would no longer pay to
maintain that training facility and, by the end of the year,
the Lokomotiv football club gifted the stadium to the
Krasnodar regional government (Fomin 2015). Regional
authorities promised to upgrade the field and construct an
international-quality stadium, despite the fact that the site is
no longer associated with the World Cup. No funding has
been announced for this project and the stadium remains in
poor condition. The other three original training sites, being
privately owned and in better condition, are continuing
operations as before, renting out sports facilities, and offer-
ing package holiday tours with hotel rooms on-site.
Without official attention from host authorities, however,
they are sidelined from the action: there will be no infra-
structure improvements and World Cup teams will not stay
at their hotels or use their training facilities. It is not
possible to know why these actors have been sidelined,
but from the available evidence, we infer that the owners
of these private facilities lack strong enough connections to
earn inclusion in the narrowing circle of neopatrimonial
relationships. It appears they were not judged important
enough to keep close.
Of the three new sites in the latest revision of Decree
518, only one remains privately owned and funded. Owned
by the Sochi-Park amusement park group, this is the smal-
lest project of the lot; it was constructed for the Sochi
Olympics and needs only minor upgrades to fulfill FIFA
requirements. The other two sites are new constructions: a
short walk from one of the base camps cut from the original
plan, federal and regional funds are now building from
scratch in empty lots by the Black Sea. ASK-Monolit, a
private construction company from Krasnodar, won the
tender for these two new training stadiums at a bid of 204
million rubles ($3.1 million) (RosTender 2016b). Since
building new stadiums costs more than upgrading existing
structures, this raises the question of why the state would
fund projects that are more expensive than other options.
This move seems all the more absurd given the constraints
of the economic crisis.
In this case, a balanced budget seems less important than
perhaps ensuring that funds flow to the right people. While
it is not possible to illuminate the relationships that make
ASK-Monolit the company of choice for this project, we
can ascertain some details about the company and its
director, Aleksandr Krisan. According to public record,
Mr. Krisan currently runs five active construction compa-
nies in Russia: one in Tyumen, two in Krasnodar (one of
which is ASK-Monolit), and two in Moscow. He founded
his first company in 1993, which survived until 2008 when
it was liquidated in arbitration court. His remaining firms
all display characteristics suspiciously similar to shell com-
panies. The two Moscow firms are registered in buildings
known to authorities as sites of mass company registration,
while the three regional firms—including the one that won
the Sochi World Cup tender—are registered in small pri-
vate apartments. ASK-Monolit’s website states that the
company employs 89 engineers and 485 laborers, but
these people clearly have nothing to do with the tiny dwell-
ing that is their employer’s legal address. So although we
cannot prove that ASK-Monolit is breaking the law, and we
cannot know what connections Aleksandr Krisan has with
World Cup planning authorities, it is clear that the firm and
its owner at least share many characteristics with the
shadowy world of quasi-legal business entities. As before,
we cannot say with certainty why ASK-Monolit was
brought into the World Cup preparations—perhaps it was
merely bribery, which is separate from neopatrimonialism.
Or, if it was bribery, this could also be seen as a bid to enter
a neopatrimonial relationship. Nevertheless, we maintain
that interpreting these events through the lens of crisis
neopatrimonialism provides a plausible explanation for
why a different company would be brought in to develop
a new project at greater cost than what had originally been
planned.
In this light, the training ground developments in Sochi
demonstrate how the economic crisis reordered those elites
benefiting from rents. The frequent revisions to the building
program for the World Cup are only partly an exercise in cost
cutting, as could be expected from the squeezed budget. Put
simply, the revisions to Decree 518 canceledmany projects, but
those that remained became more expensive and benefited
different actors. As before, this reflects a wider trend in World
Cup infrastructure projects: a full third of the training sites
nationwide mirrored this pattern of replacing private projects
with state-owned and state-funded constructions, usually at a
price increase. Looking beyond only training infrastructure, the
revisions of Decree 518 show a similar expansion of federal or
regional control in 14 percent of total projects, as host autho-
rities replaced privately owned facilities with new, public ones.
We are witnessing processes of crisis-driven change in World
Cup preparations nationwide. If we continue to interpret these
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events through crisis neopatrimonialism, we see that—rather
than diminishing neopatrimonial relationships through
enforced fiscal responsibility—the economic crisis appears to
engender a rethinking of who matters and who does not.
Increased Price of Loyalty Among Elites
In standard neopatrimonial systems, patrons reward clients
with rents in order to secure their loyalty. Crisis neopatri-
monialism leaves this relationship unchanged but appears
to encourage elites to demand higher payments for their
continued loyalty. In other words, the economic crisis
causes the overall pool of rents to shrink. The subsequent
increased political and economic uncertainty inspires elites
to take as much as possible, constrained only by how
valuable or necessary each actor is within the neopatrimo-
nial relationship. In effect, this is a gamble on an actor’s
value to the neopatrimonial system. If the actor is not
deemed important enough, his attempts to secure a higher
share of rents will result in ejection from the system, as
shown in the dramatic ownership and financing conflicts in
the reconstruction of Kaliningrad’s Khrabrovo airport. This
case demonstrates how the economic crisis caused the turn-
over of key actors in Kaliningrad’s political and business
structures, as certain elites gambled and lost (see Table 3).
According to FIFA, host authorities must provide efficient
and reliable transport at a number of scales: from abroad into
the host nation, within the nation between host cities, and
within the host cities between areas of importance such as
the transit hubs, hotels, and most critically, the football sta-
dium (Kassens-Noor 2014). All host cities must have trans-
port systems that meet FIFA requirements, but air transport
will play a crucial role in the 2018World Cup. Due to Russia’s
vast size, travel times between the host cities are mostly
unmanageable without airplanes; consequently, FIFA has
emphasized the necessity of upgrading the nation’s air trans-
port system (FIFA 2010b). For air travel, FIFA requires a
strategic plan that considers international and domestic con-
nectivity, quality control, and passenger capacities (FIFA
2016). Specifically, host cities must expand passenger
throughput capacity in order to handle peakWorld Cup traffic,
focusing on a ten-hour period before and after the matches.
Most airports in Russia have a complicated ownership
and management structure that blends federal, regional, and
private actors. Decree 518 reflects these complications by
stipulating that every host city airport reconstruction pro-
ject (save one exception in Moscow) will be funded accord-
ing to ownership: federal money will repair and reconstruct
the federal portions of an airport, while regional and private
money will go toward regionally and privately owned facil-
ities (Russian Federal Government 2013). Nationwide, host
authorities planned repair and construction projects to bring
each of the thirteen host city airports up to a high infra-
structure standard, increasing passenger throughput capa-
city to handle the peak crowds of World Cup visitors
(Russian World Cup Bid Committee 2010). Seven of
these airport projects are considered urgent because their
throughput capacities and overall infrastructure quality fall
below standard. Kaliningrad’s Khrabrovo airport is one of
these seven, but since the Kaliningrad region is separated
from the contiguous Russian Federation, both regional and
federal governments give air transport facilities special
priority beyond most other host cities. Khrabrovo airport
is a lifeline to the Russian mainland and a plum property.
During the process of reconstruction for the World Cup, it
TABLE 3
Airport Khrabrovo, Key Events in Ownership and Control 2002–2015.
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became a battleground between various political and busi-
ness coalitions.
Since it was partially privatized in 2002–2003,
Khrabrovo airport has undergone a series of controversial
ownership changes and reconstruction projects. Despite
significant investments and material improvements, the air-
port still failed to meet FIFA requirements for quality and
capacity by the time Kaliningrad was chosen for a World
Cup host city. During this time a scrum for ownership of
the airport developed between two holding companies,
AeroInvest and Novaport, each run by a wealthy and
well-connected businessman. These companies involved
different contractors to upgrade the airport, and the battle
came down to which of these groups would walk away with
the prize of airport ownership and a prime government
contract for international-level infrastructure upgrades.
Further complicating the picture, the airport holding com-
panies themselves comprise convoluted partnerships of
numerous governmental and private actors.
In 2008 RosAviatsia, the Russian federal aviation
agency, paved the way for AeroInvest to assume control
of the airport by revoking the previous owners’ license to
operate flights, due to bankruptcy proceedings and debts of
nearly 11 billion rubles ($169 million) (Ekimovskii 2008).
Two banks took possession of the airport as payment for
debts: Vnesheconombank (a Moscow-based development
bank) and Bank St. Petersburg. To manage their new hold-
ing, the two banks formed a private company called Airport
Khrabrovo. In 2012, Bank St. Petersburg sold its 75 percent
share in Airport Khrabrovo to AeroInvest. As part of this
purchase, the company was required to transfer 20 percent
of the airport to the Kaliningrad regional government
(Vedomosti 2013). The fractured ownership structure now
stood as follows: operating under the name Airport
Khrabrovo, the airport was owned and managed by a part-
nership between Vnesheconombank, the Kaliningrad regio-
nal government, and majority owner AeroInvest.
AeroInvest is owned by the Sindika holding group, itself
owned by Arsen Kanokov, a businessman with a storied
political career: he is a high council member of United
Russia (the nation’s dominant political party), a senator in
the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian
parliament), and the former president of the Republic of
Kabardino Balkaria in the Russian North Caucasus. Though
AeroInvest paid 2.4 billion rubles ($37 million) for a
Khrabrovo reconstruction project, by 2014 the airport still
did not meet FIFA standards (RIA 2012). So, in order to
fulfill World Cup requirements, host authorities presented
AeroInvest and RosAviatsia with a plan to expand and
modernize the airport. They signed a deal for 3.2 billion
rubles ($49 million), established a deadline of November
2016, and promised the federal government would pay. The
chosen contractor was Stroinovatsia, a construction com-
pany owned by one of Russia’s wealthiest men: Ziyavudin
Magomedov (Forbes 2016a). The AeroInvest/Stroinovatsia
project was planned to increase the airport’s capacity to
exceed FIFA’s throughput requirements by 20 percent
(LenAeroProekt 2013).
At this point economic crisis struck. Stroinovatsia claimed
it required more money and time to complete the job because
of crisis-caused delays and higher costs on material imports,
due to the weak ruble. While the strained economic situation
certainly affected renovation plans, we contend there is also
neopatrimonial logic at play. Magomedov, who in 2010 had
been awarded the Order of Friendship by the Russian presi-
dent, in effect attempted to leverage his importance in the
neopatrimonial network to secure more rents. Delays were a
key part of Stroinovatsia’s ploy, but Magomedov seems to
have taken the game too far: once the project was nearly a year
behind schedule, the Kaliningrad governor publicly appealed
to the federal government, inviting deputy primeminister Igor
Shuvalov and sports minister Vitalii Mutko—two of the driv-
ing forces behind the World Cup and both members of the
hosting coalition—to inspect the airport and get the project on
track (Kiselyova 2015). This appeal to higher authority ulti-
mately resulted in a new airport owner and project contractor.
This change involved Roman Trotsenko, a Russian multi-
millionaire associated with the influential Rosneft oil company
(Forbes 2016b). In mid-2016, Trotsenko completed the pur-
chase of controlling equity in AeroInvest, giving his holding
company Novaport control of Khrabrovo airport (Vorobev
2016a). Purchasing Khrabrovo meant taking responsibility for
the stalled reconstruction project, which Trotsenko promised to
complete by the fourth quarter of 2017 (NewKaliningrad.ru
2016).
Next, Trotsenko and Novaport announced that it was
impossible to work with Stroinovatsia as contractor.
Managing these relationships at the federal level,
RosAviatsia claimed breach of contract in order to sever
ties, but Stroinovatsia continued blaming its delays on the
economic crisis and filed a motion in Moscow arbitration
court to maintain the contract. Neither Novaport nor
RosAviatsia could legally appoint a new contractor until
the conflict was resolved, so work on the airport was still
frozen, even as the World Cup deadline inched closer.
Under pressure from the federal government,
Stroinovatsia eventually agreed to drop its court case and
withdraw from the contract if RosAviatsia agreed to accept
the airport work already done and not demand the return of
their 1.1 billion ruble ($17 million) advance (Vorobev
2016b). Once Magomedov and Stroinovatsia retreated
from the project, Novaport announced that
Tsentrodorstroi, a venerable Moscow construction company
involved with other World Cup projects, would take the job
as contractor (Amozov 2016). The new contract was
awarded for 3.39 billion rubles ($52 million) (TASS
2017). This is more than the 3.2 billion rubles ($49 million)
initially awarded to Stroinovatsia, but the total cost to the
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public is higher, since the billion ruble advance vanished
with the legal settlement.
The conflicts over the airport project demonstrate once
again the reordering of elites that we identify as the second
feature of crisis neopatrimonialism. In short order after
World Cup development began, the airport owners, the
general contractor, and even the regional governor all
were replaced. Arsen Kanokov, the politician and business-
man, not only lost control of AeroInvest (and consequently
his holdings in other airports besides Kaliningrad), but he
was ejected from the high council of the United Russia
party as well (Interfax 2016; NewsRu.com 2016). Having
lost his stake in the airport game, Kanokov moved to
expand his hotel empire and attempted to purchase the
Radisson Blu hotel in Sochi that was built for the 2014
Olympics (Pastushin 2017). This property belonged to
Abas Aliev, a hotel magnate who was forced out of his
own holding company and fined hundreds of millions of
dollars by a Moscow arbitration court (Mertsalova 2016).
We can see here the cascading effects down the neopatri-
monial hierarchy, as actors higher up the ladder force out
smaller players down the chain.
In Kanokov’s place, the well-connected Roman Trotsenko
and his growing company Novaport have moved to control
Khrabrovo. Stroinovatsia and Ziyavudin Magomedov were
removed from the airport reconstruction and remain under
court pressure to deliver on other projects. The Kaliningrad
airport case demonstrates a third and final feature of crisis
neopatrimonialism: how the economic crisis encouraged elites
—keenly aware of the increased economic pressure and the
contractual requirements to fulfill World Cup obligations—to
charge higher prices for their participation in the neopatrimo-
nial bargain. In many cases this translated into using their
projects as bargaining tools to extract more public money, in
effect holding the government ransom. In Kaliningrad, we see
actors like Kanokov and Magomedov attempting to charge
more for their continued loyalty, gambling on the security of
their positions and the urgency of the World Cup projects. In
the end they lost their positions—a development we interpret as
a misjudgment of their value while attempting to extract higher
rents. There are examples in other World Cup development
projects where actors have taken similar risks and profited
hugely, for example the World Cup stadium construction in
Samara. But while trying to increase the costs of loyalty was a
general phenomenon, the outcomes of this strategy varied:
sometimes we see the gamblers emerging with greater profits,
but in Kaliningrad, Kanokov and Magomedov gambled and
lost. Further, the pressure on Magomedov even in projects
unrelated to the World Cup (Zibrova and Petlevoi 2017) sug-
gests shifts in the broader neopatrimonial system, but as these
relationships are negotiated away from public scrutiny, we
cannot know for certain. It is possible, for instance, that
Magomedov is being attacked for unrelated political reasons,
or that these machinations are the result of an intensification in
competition among elites for rents. We note similar stories
across World Cup projects and even beyond, and we argue
that crisis neopatrimonialism can provide a plausible explana-
tion for these developments.
CONCLUSION
The economic crisis since 2014—and subsequent pressure
on the system of rent distribution—has affected the Russian
World Cup development program. We demonstrated three
features of crisis neopatrimonialism through three case stu-
dies: the reconstruction of training facilities in Rostov; the
construction of new training stadiums in Sochi; and the
reconstruction of the airport in Kaliningrad. In Rostov, the
shift away from independent funding indicates a reward for
private actors, as the state assumed the obligation to pay. In
Sochi, the removal and replacement of private projects repre-
sents a reordering of the circle of favored elites, as certain
actors merited further rewards while others were excluded.
Finally, in Kaliningrad, the convoluted story surrounding the
ownership and reconstruction of the airport revealed that
actors were attempting to leverage their value in the neopa-
trimonial system in bids to earn higher rents in times of
economic insecurity. At least in the case of the World Cup,
instead of threatening the neopatrimonial system, the eco-
nomic crisis has led to adaptations, shifting private obliga-
tions onto public shoulders, reordering the circle of favorites,
and inspiring elites to gamble for higher rents.
Naturally, we recognize that it is not reasonable to make
absolute conclusions about Russia’s broader political econ-
omy by extrapolating from the World Cup. Instead, in using
World Cup developments to investigate crisis-driven
changes in Russian neopatrimonialism, we attempt to
shine a light on the changes themselves and to question
whether these may be indicative of larger dynamics.
Though focused on the World Cup, our investigation thus
raises questions about similar patterns of crisis-driven
change potentially visible elsewhere in Russia. For exam-
ple, we might see developments that resemble crisis neopa-
trimonialism in St. Petersburg, where the Transept Group
(majority-owned by Boris Rotenberg, a longtime ally of the
Russian president) replaced the original contractor to build
a new stage for the Maly Theater (Interfax 2017; Zarubina
2016). Similarly we could investigate the years of wran-
gling over the reconstruction of the Khabarovsk airport, as
a litany of investors appeared and disappeared in the scrum
to upgrade this privately owned facility (Sherbakov et al.
2016; Vorobev 2017, 2016c). At the same time, it is possi-
ble that the changes we have identified in this paper are
affecting only sectors involved in preparing for the 2018
World Cup, and may simply be an effect of mega-event
development in Russia. Ultimately, whether and how
Russia at large has changed in response to the ongoing
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economic crisis will have to be the subject of further
studies.
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